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Abstract. We characterize the complete set of equilibrium allocations to an intrinsic com-
mon agency screening game as the set of solutions to self-generating optimization programs.
We provide a complete characterization of equilibrium outcomes for regular environments by
relying on techniques developed elsewhere for aggregate games and for the mechanism design
delegation literature. The set of equilibria include those with non-differentiable payoffs and
discontinuous choices, as well as equilibria that are smooth and continuous in types. We iden-
tify one equilibrium, the maximal equilibrium, which is the unique solution to a self-generating
optimization program with the largest (or “maximal”) domain, and the only equilibrium that
is supported with bi-conjugate (i.e., least-concave) tariffs. The maximal equilibrium exhibits
a n-fold distortion caused by each of the n principal’s non-cooperative behavior in over-
harvesting the agent’s information rent. Furthermore, in any equilibrium, over any interval
of types in which there is full separation, the agent’s equilibrium action corresponds to the
allocation in the maximal equilibrium. Under mild conditions, the maximal equilibrium max-
imizes the agent’s information rent within the class of equilibrium allocations. When the
principals’ most-preferred equilibrium allocation differs from the maximal equilibrium, we
demonstrate that the agent’s choice function exhibits an interval of bunching over the worst
agent types, and elsewhere corresponds with the maximal allocation. The optimal region of
bunching trades off the principals’ desire to constrain inefficient n-fold marginalizations of the
agent’s rent against the inefficiency of pooling agent types.
Keywords. Intrinsic common agency, aggregate games, mechanism design for delegated
decision-making, duality, equilibrium selection.
JEL codes. D82, D86.
1. INTRODUCTION
We consider a canonical class of common agency games in which principals simulta-
neously offer contracts to a privately-informed common agent whose action is publicly
observable and contractable by all principals, and who must either accept all contract
offers from the principals or choose not to participate. Common agency is thus public
and intrinsic.1 As a motivating example, suppose there are multiple government agencies
(principals) who regulate a polluting public utility (the common agent) which has private
information about the cost of production. If the firm decides to produce, it is under the
joint control of all regulators. Regulators, however, may have conflicting objectives. For
example, an environmental agency wishes on the margin to reduce output and negative
externalities, while a public-utility commission instead prefers to increase output and
1We thank for useful remarks seminar and conference participants in UBC, the Canadian Economic
Association 2016 in Ottawa, and 2017 in Antigonish, and the 2017 SWET Meeting in Paris. We also
thank Andrea Attar, Didier Laussel, four referees and Johannes Horner for useful comments that lead
us to considerably reshape the material of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
aParis School of Economics-EHESS, david.martimort@parisschoolofeconomics.eu.
bUniversity of Ottawa, aggey.semenov@uottawa.ca.
cUniversity of Chicago, Booth School of Business. lars.stole@chicagobooth.edu.
1See Martimort (2007) for a review of these definitions and modeling choices in common agency games.
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consumer surplus. In this game regulators simultaneously offer menus of transfer-output
pairs in order to influence the choice of the public utility. The public utility must either
choose an output and abide by the consequences of each principal’s menu, or exit the
market entirely.
One of the main theoretical difficulties of modeling non-cooperative scenarios is to char-
acterize the multitude of equilibrium outcomes that can arise. In more familiar single-
principal screening environments, the Revelation Principle defines the set of relevant
communication strategies and describes feasible allocations by means of incentive com-
patibility constraints.2 With multiple principals, however, the Revelation Principle is
neither simple to apply nor particularly useful. Even though the Delegation Principle
proposed in Martimort and Stole (2002)3 does offer a simple and universal representation
of the strategy spaces available to mechanism designers in common agency environments,
this tool fails to give a complete representation of equilibrium allocations. As a result, the
literature on common agency has primarily focused on specific equilibria in structured
games rather than exploring the entire set of equilibrium possibilities. In particular, pre-
vious analyses have often restricted attention to differentiable equilibria both because of
their tractability and because of the attractiveness of the simple economic insights which
emerge. This restriction, however, is with loss of generality and the arbitrariness of such
a selection raises concerns about the robustness of any implications deduced from the
refined set. A more complete approach – the task of the present paper – is to character-
ize the entire set of equilibria, to make welfare comparisons across equilibria and, where
possible, to make broader statements which apply to all equilibria.
Insights from Aggregate Games. Our first step towards a full characterization of
equilibria relies on the fundamental structure of intrinsic common agency games. As noted
by Martimort and Stole (2012), these games are special cases of aggregate games. Because
the agent only cares about the sum of the payments offered by the non-cooperating
principals, incentive compatibility and participation constraints can only depend on the
resulting aggregate contract. As a consequence, principal i’s expected payoff depends only
upon his own contract and the aggregate contract (i.e., the sum of contracts) offered
by the other principals. Because each principal can always undo the aggregate contract
offered by others using only his own tariff, a principal can implement any incentive-feasible
allocation he would like. It follows that a necessary condition for any equilibrium is that
all principals agree on inducing the same allocation. Such agreement has remarkable
consequences. In particular, because each principal’s virtual surplus function is maximized
by the equilibrium allocation, it must also be that the sum of the principals’ individual
virtual surpluses is also maximized by this allocation. This aggregate virtual surplus
function, however, is not the same as the virtual surplus function that would arise in
a cooperative setting in which the principals jointly contract with the agent. Critically,
the former corresponds to what a fictional principal would maximize if this principal
valued rent extraction n times more than is the case. In equilibrium, everything happens
as if the individual principals were to delegate their choice of allocation to a surrogate
principal whose payoffs are distorted relative to the collective preference of the principals.
This Aggregate Concurrence Principle, as coined by Martimort and Stole (2012), is a key
2Myerson (1982).
3Also sometimes referred to as Menu Theorems in the parlance of Peters (2001).
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ingredient to characterize the set of equilibrium outcomes.4
Self-Generating Maximization Programs. The aggregate concurrence principle
provides necessary conditions for equilibria. We are, however, interested in the set of
equilibria which may be decidedly smaller. To this end, we demonstrate that the so-
lution set of carefully chosen self-generating maximization (thereafter SGM) programs
correspond to the equilibrium set of our common-agency game.5 In our common-agency
game, following the approach in Martimort and Stole (2012), we first establish that the
solution set to an infinite-dimensional SGM program corresponds to the set of equilib-
rium allocations (Proposition 1).6 Here, the self-generating objective function is found by
aggregating the principals’ virtual programs, taking the aggregate contract as given. We
demonstrate that the solutions to the SGM program in Proposition 1 are those incentive-
compatible allocations of output and agent utility which maximize an objective function
which, in turn, depends upon an aggregate tariff which implements the given output-
utility pair. Our main characterization result (Proposition 2) introduces an assumption
on the bilinearity of the agent’s preferences to reduce the SGM program to a remarkably
simple, point-wise optimization program over the set of equilibrium actions. Characteriz-
ing equilibria with SGM programs embeds the fixed-point nature of equilibrium but it also
imports the tractability and techniques found in solving simpler optimization problems
in lower dimensions.
From an economic viewpoint, SGM problems look like the problem that n cooperating
principals would face. There are two key differences, however. First, as already noted, in
the SGM program, reductions in the agent’s rent are weighted n times more than in the
cooperative program. It is as if there is a surrogate principal that maximizes a payoff
that is biased toward over-harvesting the agent’s information rent. This n-fold excess
weighting captures the fact that, in the non-cooperative scenario, each principal attempts
to extract the agent’s information rent without consideration of the distortionary costs
imposed on the other principals’ payoffs. Second, unlike the cooperative program, non-
differentiabilities in the equilibrium aggregate tariff appear in the SGM program and can
4The implication of aggregate-concurrence was used by Bernheim and Whinston (1986a) in a moral
hazard setting, but it applies to a larger class of aggregate games and, in particular, to our present
screening model.
5To be clear at the outset about our concept of an SGM program, consider a canonical maximization
program with objective function φ defined over a domain X, with the additional feature that φ is
parameterized by an arbitrary reference point, xˆ, which also lies in the choice domain, X. We denote
φ(x, xˆ) to be the value of this objective evaluated at the choice x, given the reference point xˆ. The
pair (φ,X) gives rise to a self-generating maximization program whose solution set is defined by the
requirement that each element, x∗, satisfies
x∗ ∈ arg max
x∈X
φ(x, x∗).
Hence, self-generating problems are optimization problems with a fixed point.
6Martimort and Stole (2012) used self-generating programs to prove equilibrium existence in intrinsic
common agency games under quite general conditions (general type spaces, action sets, and preferences)
but they did not characterize equilibrium strategies and allocations. This paper goes beyond existence and
describes all equilibrium allocations in more structured environments than those analyzed in Martimort
and Stole (2012). To get sharp predictions, we assume that the agent’s preferences is bilinear in output
and type. This allows us to import powerful tools from convex analysis and duality at minimal cost for
exposition.
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be self-enforcing in an equilibrium. As we will see, the lack of smoothness is the source
of equilibrium multiplicity.
From a technical viewpoint, the fact that there is a single optimization problem (what
we will refer to as the “surrogate” problem) which summarizes equilibrium behavior (and
not a collection of n different optimization problems, one for each principal) allows us
to derive important properties of the surrogate principal’s value function (e.g., absolute
continuity, envelope condition). These properties, in turn, help us characterize equilibrium
output with only minimal regularity conditions on the set of available contracts (i.e.,
upper semi-continuity). In particular, we do not impose differentiability of the tariffs at
the outset. Indeed, making such an assumption a priori would prevent us from exhibiting
non-differentiable equilibria even though, as we will see below, there is a plethora of such
equilibria, including some with attractive welfare properties.
Maximal Equilibrium. Following our characterization of the equilibrium set, we focus
on a single equilibrium – the maximal equilibrium – which, we will see, forms a basis for
all equilibria. We define and construct the maximal equilibrium as the allocation in which
the agent’s equilibrium choice set is at its largest (i.e., maximal) and the optimization
program is unconstrained (Proposition 2, Corollary 1). In regular environments charac-
terized by a monotone hazard rate of the types distribution, the maximal equilibrium
features an n-fold asymmetric information distortion. This allocation is remarkable for
at least two reasons. First, it has been the implicit focus of all applied research in public
screening environments to date (Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 17), Martimort and
Semenov (2008), Martimort and Stole (2009a, 2009b) among others). Second, we estab-
lish in Proposition 4 that this equilibrium allocation is the unique equilibrium allocation
that is supported with biconjugate (i.e., least-concave) tariffs: the maximal equilibrium is
smooth, its choice allocation is continuous, and each principal offers a continuous, concave
tariff.
Complete Set of Equilibria. Using the properties of the SGM program allows us to
characterize specific features of any equilibrium. Because Proposition 2 establishes that
an equilibrium is completely identified with the range of equilibrium choices made by
the various types of agents, we can view the set of equilibrium allocations as a surrogate
principal’s optimization program given an equilibrium set of outputs. In this sense, the
optimization program shares techniques that were recently developed in the mechanism
design literature on delegated decision-making.7 This literature has shown that the so-
lution to the optimal delegation problem are allocations that are either independent of
the privately-informed party’s information or that instead correspond to the individu-
als’s ideal point. This important insight carries over into our setting. At points where the
equilibrium output is continuous and separating, the allocation can be identified with the
maximal equilibrium allocation in Corollary 1. Elsewhere, equilibrium allocations entail
discontinuities and bunching (Proposition 3). It is worth noting that the discontinuous
equilibria can be constructed from the maximal allocation by introducing gaps in the
range of equilibrium outputs. These allocations exhibit bunching, even in regular envi-
ronments satisfying the monotone hazard rate condition, and discontinuities at points
7See Holmstro¨m (1984), Melumad and Shibano (1991), Martimort and Semenov (2006), Alonso and
Matouschek (2008), and Amador and Bagwell (2013) among others.
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where the surrogate surplus nevertheless remains constant. Tariffs in these equilibria are
not biconjugate. They entail large negative payments over the discontinuity gaps. These
punishments prevent not only the agent from choosing outputs in the gap but also the
principals from deviating with contracts that would induce the agent to choose outputs in
the gap. Imposing biconjugacy rules out the implicit coordination that principals might
reach by specifying offers with infinitely negative payments. Biconjugacy makes more
deviations attractive. It acts thus as a refinement of the equilibrium set.
Welfare comparisons. We conclude our analysis with a consideration of the welfare
properties of the equilibrium set, viewed from both the agent and the principals’ perspec-
tives. In Proposition 5, we show that the agent prefers the maximal equilibrium allocation
to all neighboring, discontinuous equilibrium outcomes.
The preferred equilibrium of the principals (i.e., what they would choose collectively
to maximize the sum of their payoffs) may differ from the maximal equilibrium. Because
equilibria must be solutions to the SGM program, we can determine the principals’ op-
timal equilibrium as the solution to a delegation game in which the principals delegate
to the surrogate (with distorted preferences) to select an equilibrium on their behalf.
Indeed, everything happens as if non-cooperating principals were jointly delegating to
their surrogate representative the decision to choose an output for each possible realiza-
tion of the agent’s type. Of course, the difference in objectives between the principals
acting collectively and their fictional surrogate captures the loss due to non-cooperative
behavior. Viewed as a delegation design problem, we draw on recent advances in the del-
egation literature (Amador and Bagwell (2013)) to determine the optimal equilibrium. In
Proposition 6, we demonstrate that the principals-preferred equilibrium generally differs
from the maximal equilibrium, inducing a “floor” on outputs (by means of sufficiently
large punishments for outputs below this floor) which prevents excessive rent extraction.
Intuitively, by refusing to pay the agent for outputs which are too low, principals reach
a minimal amount of coordination and attenuate their incentives to over-harvest the
agent’s information rent. The optimal region of bunching trades off the principals’ desire
to constrain inefficient, n-fold marginalizations of the agent’s rent against the inefficiency
of pooling agent types.
Literature review. Existing characterization results for common agency models are
quite fragmented and cover various contracting scenarios. Assuming symmetric infor-
mation and delegated common agency with public contracts, Bernheim and Whinston
(1986a) and Laussel and Lebreton (1998, 2001) have described payoffs for the so-called
truthful equilibria while Chiesa and Denicolo` (2009) have investigated the case of private
contracts. The former authors focus on truthful tariffs, with one justification being that
they are coalition-proof as proved in Bernheim and Whinston (1986a), to ensure that
each principal’s contribution exactly reflects his preferences over possible alternatives.
Efficiency follows. The only remaining question is how the possibility that the agent may
reject some offer redistributes surplus among players.
Under asymmetric information, the distributions of equilibrium payoffs can no longer
be disentangled from the allocative distortions that arise at equilibrium. Martimort and
Stole (2015) present necessary conditions which are satisfied by all equilibrium outcomes
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of a delegated public common agency game. Compared with the intrinsic counterpart,
delegated public common agency games allow the agent to refuse any strict subset of
the principals’ offers if he wishes so. Martimort and Stole (2015) derive maximal equi-
libria in those contexts and observe that they differ from maximal equilibria in intrinsic
games because these additional strategic possibilities require that tariffs must remain
non-negative. The necessary conditions in Martimort and Stole (2015) remain compact
enough to describe both continuous and discontinuous equilibrium allocations just as
in the intrinsic scenario that is our focus hereafter. Yet, these conditions differ from
those presented below because there are fewer deviations available under delegated com-
mon agency. Moreover, these necessary conditions are not sufficient; sufficiency has to
be checked directly in contrast with the analysis of intrinsic games developed hereafter
where sufficiency is immediate. The difference comes from the fact that intrinsic games
are bijective aggregate games in the parlance of Martimort and Stole (2012). Knowing
the solution to the self-generating problem is enough to recover solutions to all princi-
pals’ optimization problems. Delegated agency games do not satisfy bijectivity since the
possibility of rejecting any offer implies that contracts are necessarily non-negative. This
makes it impossible for principals to undo all aggregate offers, while undoing aggregate
tariffs is always feasible under intrinsic common agency.
Among others, Stole (1991), Martimort (1992), Martimort and Stole (2009a), Calzo-
lari (2001) and Calzolari and Denicolo` (2013) for private contracting, Laffont and Tirole
(1993, Chapter 17), Laussel and Lebreton (1998), Martimort and Semenov (2008), Marti-
mort and Stole (2009b), Hoernig and Valletti (2011) for public contracting have described
various differentiable equilibria that arise under asymmetric information in intrinsic com-
mon agency games with a continuum of types. None of these papers investigate the full set
of equilibria as we do here. This step is possible by building on techniques similar to those
in Martimort and Stole (2015) but now specialized to intrinsic common agency games.
Laussel and Resende (2016) also tackle this problem in the specific context of competing
manufacturers. Beside other technical differences, their approach in characterizing equi-
librium allocations proceeds by deriving necessary conditions based on individual best
responses which are stricter than ours. This leaves aside the issue of whether the allo-
cations so found are indeed equilibria. Necessary and sufficient conditions are obtained
altogether with our approach based on viewing equilibria as solutions to self-generating
problems for bijective aggregate common agency games. Moreover, our approach allows
us to directly identify equilibrium output profiles with implementable allocations of a
simple mechanism design problem of delegated decision-making. This allows us to lever-
age valuable tools from this literature, first to describe all equilibrium allocations and
second to find the best one from the principals’ viewpoint.
Organization. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 describes the set of incentive
feasible allocations. We present there some of the duality tools that are used throughout
the paper, defining in particular the notion of biconjugacy. We also briefly review the co-
operative benchmark. Section 4 presents the self-generating optimization problems that
represent equilibria. Section 5 characterizes those equilibria. Section 6 discusses equilib-
rium selection and welfare. Proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
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2. AN INTRINSIC COMMON AGENCY GAME
The focus of this paper is on common agency games with n > 1 principals (indexed
by i ∈ {1, .., n}), each of whom contracts with a single common agent. We assume that
common agency is intrinsic and the choice variable of the agent is public (i.e., commonly
observable and contractible by all principals). For some of the interpretations below, it
is useful thinking of the agent as producing a good or service on behalf of the principals.
Preferences. All principals and the agent have quasi-linear preferences over output q
and payments ti that are defined, respectively, as
Si(q)− ti (principal i) ∀i ∈ {1, .., n} and
n∑
i=1
ti − θq (common agent).
The agent produces a good on behalf of the principals by selecting a q from the an
interval of feasible outputs, Q = [0, qmax] . We assume that the payoff functions Si (for
i ∈ {1, .., n}) are strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable over Q, and that
non-participation by the agent is equivalent to a choice of q = 0. Without loss of generality,
we normalize principal payoffs so that Si(0) = 0. Thus, Si(q) represents the net utility of
principal i relative to the outside option of q = 0.8 We denote the aggregate principals’
surplus by S(q) =
∑n
i=1 Si(q) and the aggregate surplus for all principals except i by
S−i(q) =
∑
j 6=i Sj(q).
Contracts. Using the Delegation Principle, Martimort and Stole (2002) demonstrate
that there is no loss of generality in studying pure-strategy common agency equilibria to
require that principals’ strategy spaces are restricted to tariffs from output to transfers.
Let T be the set of all upper semi-continuous mappings, Ti, from Q into R (for i ∈
{1, .., n}).
We denote an arbitrary array of contracts by T = (T1, ..., Tn) ∈ T n.9 An aggregate
contract (or, in short, an aggregate) is defined as T (q) =
∑n
i=1 Ti(q). We also use the
notation T−i and T−i(q) =
∑
j 6=i Tj(q) to denote, respectively, an array of contracts and
the aggregate contract from all principals but i.
8That the agent’s utility function is bilinear in θ and q allows us to import many direct results from
duality theory from convex analysis (for instance, our notion of biconjugacy below). These findings could
be generalized to preferences for the agent of the sort ti + u(θ, q) for some u function. The relevant
notions of convexity is u-convexity as discussed in Carlier (2001) and Basov (2005, Chapter 3). We
can also easily generalize the agent’s preferences to allow for the addition of a nonlinear function of
q. Specifically, suppose that the agent’s payoff is
∑n
i=1 ti + S0(q) − θq, where S0 is a concave function
normalized at S0(0) = 0 that represents the agent’s intrinsic benefit of production. Redefine payments
from each principal and their respective payoff functions so that t˜i = ti− S0(q)n and S˜i(q) = Si(q) + S0(q)n
(for i ∈ {1, .., n}). One can verify that S˜i(0) = 0 and the expressions for the principals’ and the agent’s
utility functions can be written, respectively, as S˜i(q) − t˜i and
∑n
i=1 t˜i − θq, which is the simpler form
that we have adopted.
9We do not consider stochastic payment schedules because they have no value in our context with risk
neutral players. Any stochastic payment schedule that would offer a lottery over payments for a given
value of the agent’s output could be replaced by the corresponding expected payment without changing
payoffs and incentives. Also, we do not consider the possibility of writing contracts on contracts as in
Szentes (2015). In some contexts (regulatory environments or competition in nonlinear pricing), such
referencing of contracts is ruled out by institutional constraints.
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Timing and Information. The timing is typical of principal-agent screening games,
but now with n principals contracting instead of one. First, the agent privately learns his
type (a cost parameter), θ, that is distributed over the support Θ = [θL, θH ] according
to a continuous, commonly-known distribution F (θ), with corresponding positive density
f(θ). Let Eθ[·] denote the expectation operator with respect to the distribution of types.
Second, principals simultaneously offer the agent the tariffs, Ti : Q → R, which are
promises to pay Ti(q) to the agent following the choice of q ∈ Q = [0, qmax]. Our assump-
tion that common agency is public is captured by the fact that all principals contract on
the same observed choice by the agent.
Third, the agent either accepts or rejects all of the principals’ offers (i.e., common
agency is intrinsic).10 Refusing to participate results in zero transfers and a reservation
payoff of zero to all players. Formally, we denote the agent’s participation decision by
the strategy δ, where δ = 1 indicates acceptance and δ = 0 indicates rejection. Thus, the
agent’s strategy is a pair of functions, {δ, q}, mapping agent types and principal contract
offers into {0, 1}×Q. If all contracts are accepted (δ = 1), the agent then chooses q ∈ Q
to maximize his utility and receives payments from each principal according to their
contractual offers. Upper semicontinuity, together with the compactness of Q, ensure
that an optimal output exists. If, however, contracts are rejected (δ = 0), then by default
q = 0, all transfers are zero and each player earns a normalized payoff of 0.
Equilibrium: Our focus in this paper is on equilibrium allocations that arise in a pure-
strategy Perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a n+2-tuple {T 1, . . . , T n, q0, δ0} (with aggregate T (q) =∑n
i=1 T i(q)) such that
1. q0(θ,T) and δ0(θ,T) jointly maximize the agent’s payoff:
{q0(θ,T), δ0(θ,T)} ∈ arg max
q∈Q,δ∈{0,1}
δT (q)− θq ∀θ ∈ Θ,∀T ∈ T .
2. T i maximizes principal i’s expected payoff given the other principals’ contracts T−i:
T i ∈ arg max
Ti∈T
Eθ
[
Si(q0(θ, Ti,T−i))− δ0(θ, Ti,T−i))Ti(q0(θ, Ti,T−i))
]
, ∀θ ∈ Θ.
For any equilibrium, {T, q0, δ0}, we define the associated equilibrium allocation as the
triplet: δ(θ) = δ0(θ,T), q(θ) = q0(θ,T), and U(θ) = δ(θ)T (q(θ))− θq(θ).
In what follows, it will be useful to refer to the set of type-allocation mappings that
are implementable for some aggregate tariff, denoted I, and to the subset of those type-
allocation mappings that arise in some equilibrium, denoted Ieq.
Definition 2 An allocation (U, q, δ), U : Θ → R, q : Θ → Q, δ : Θ → {0, 1}, is
implementable if there is an aggregate tariff, T : Q → R such that
(q(θ), δ(θ)) ∈ arg max
q∈Q,δ∈{0,1}
δT (q)− θq,
10Partial participation is not an option contrary to the scenario studied in Martimort and Stole (2015).
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U(θ) = max
q∈Q,δ∈{0,1}
δT (q)− θq.
The set of all implementable allocations is denoted I.
An allocation (U, q, δ) is an equilibrium allocation, or equilibrium implementable, if it
is implementable by an aggregate tariff, T , that arises at an equilibrium.
Proposition 1 below shows that, for any equilibrium allocation (U, q, δ), there exists
another equilibrium allocation in which the agent always participates, δ(θ) = 1 for all θ.
For this reason, we will subsequently focus our attention on the pair (U, q) and suppress
the type-allocation mapping for δ. Yet, our more general formulation remains useful for
two reasons. First, it allows us to incorporate the agent’s decision to participate as a
requirement of implementability.11 Second, it accounts for the possibility of equilibria
where principals make non-serious offers. Indeed, there always exist uninteresting, trivial
equilibria induced by a coordination failures in which two or more principals require
sufficiently negative payments for each q ∈ Q so that it is not profitable for any principal
to induce agent participation and δ = 0 for such equilibrium allocations.
Full Information Allocation. The first-best allocation (U fb, qfb) is obtained when
principals cooperate and know the agent’s cost parameter. In this scenario, principals
jointly request production at the first-best level, qfb(θ), and set transfers which extract
the agent’s surplus. Assuming S ′(0) ≥ θH and S ′(qmax) ≤ θL to avoid corner solutions,12
we obtain
S ′(qfb(θ)) = θ and U fb(θ) = 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ.13
3. IMPLEMENTABILITY, DUALITY AND COOPERATIVE BENCHMARK
The following Lemma provides a standard characterization of the set of implementable
allocations by means of familiar incentive and participation constraints.
Lemma 1 An allocation (U, q) belongs to I if and only if:
1. U(θ) is absolutely continuous and differentiable almost everywhere with
(3.1) U˙(θ) = −q(θ)
2. U(θ) is convex (equivalently, q(θ) is non-increasing)
11This is Item 3 in Lemma 1 below. This requirement was left implicit in the description of incentive-
feasible allocations given in Martimort and Stole (2012). We find it useful to make this requirement
explicit for completeness and clarity.
12In the sequel, we shall assume that the second condition (which prevents a corner at the upper bound
of the feasible outputs) always holds. The first condition will be sometimes modified below to account for
the fact that output remains positive under stringent conditions when there is asymmetric information.
In this case, we will be explicit about such modification.
13This outcome is also one possible equilibrium of the intrinsic common agency game when it takes
place under complete information. In sharp contrast with the analysis under asymmetric information
that will follow, the principals’ non-cooperative behavior need not entail any welfare loss. However,
many other inefficient equilibria exist.
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3. Agent participation is optimal for all types:
(3.2) U(θ) ≥ 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Tariffs. Once given an allocation satisfying (3.1) and convexity, simple duality argu-
ments allow us to recover the expression of a nonlinear tariff that implements this allo-
cation. As a first step, we observe that any aggregate contract T ∈ T that implements
an allocation (U, q) satisfies the inequality
U(θ) = T (q(θ))− θq(θ) ≥ T (q)− θq ∀q ∈ Q.
Equivalently,
T (q) ≤ U(θ) + θq ∀q ∈ Q,
with equality at q = q(θ). From this, we immediately obtain an upper bound T ∗(q) on
all implementing contracts as
(3.3) T ∗(q) = min
θ∈Θ
U(θ) + θq ∀q ∈ Q.
In fact, T ∗ is the least-concave upper semi-continuous tariff implementing (U, q) and thus
(3.4) U(θ) = max
q∈Q
T ∗(q)− θq ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Using the language of convex analysis, the dual conditions (3.3) and (3.4) show that U
and T ∗ are conjugate functions. Because T ∗ is a minimum of linear functions, it is itself
concave.
Since the high-cost type’s participation constraint is binding, a property that holds
both in the common agency equilibria explored below and when principals cooperate, we
have U(θH) = 0. Hence, T
∗(0) = 0 and the agent is always indifferent between accepting
such offer T ∗ while producing zero output, and refusing to participate.
For further reference, observe also that (3.3) can be written by means of (3.4) in a more
compact form that highlights the fact that U and T ∗ are conjugate functions:
T ∗(q) = min
θ∈Θ
{
max
q′∈Q
{T ∗(q′)− θq′}+ θq
}
.
Broadening the applicability of this biconjugacy property, we offer the following definition.
Definition 3 An aggregate contract T is biconjugate if and only if T (0) = 0 and
T (q) = min
θ∈Θ
{
max
q′∈Q
{T (q′)− θq′}+ θq
}
∀q ∈ Q.
An allocation (U, q) ∈ Ieq is a biconjugate equilibrium if and only if it is equilibrium
implemented by an aggregate biconjugate tariff T .
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Remarks. Biconjugate functions are concave functions such that T ∗(0) = 0.14 Observe
that a biconjugate contract, T ∗, takes finite values since Q is bounded. T ∗ is also concave
over the convex hull of q(Θ)
⋃{0} and is linear for intervals of q that lie outside q(Θ). As
a comparison, consider now the following tariff T0, taking values over the extended real
line:
(3.5) T0(q) =
{
T ∗(q) if q ∈ q(Θ)⋃{0} ,
−∞ otherwise.
It is straightforward to check that T0 also implements the allocation (U, q). But while T0
inherits the concavity of T ∗ over all connected subsets of q(Θ), T0 is not itself biconjugate.
T0 differs from T
∗ in the sense that, had the agent trembled in choosing outputs, choices
outside of the equilibrium range q(Θ) would be severely punished. To illustrate, had q(Θ)
taken only a finite number of values, T0 would be a familiar forcing contract. Such forcing
contracts are inconsistent with biconjugacy.
Cooperative outcome. Suppose that principals cooperate in designing contracts. Un-
der asymmetric information, the optimal cooperative allocation (U
c
, qc) is a solution to:
(Pc) : max
(U,q)∈I
Eθ [S(q(θ))− θq(θ)− U(θ)] .
The solution to this monopolistic screening problem is well known. For tractability, we
assume the distribution of types satisfies the standard monotone hazard rate property.15
Formally, we assume
H(θ) =
F (θ)
f(θ)
is nondecreasing and differentiable for all θ ∈ Θ. Equipped with this regularity condition,
we state the well-known characterization of the cooperative solution. The cooperative
output satisfies
(3.6)
{
S ′(qc(θ)) = θ +H(θ) if S ′(0) ≥ θ +H(θ),
qc(θ) = 0 otherwise.
The agent’s corresponding rent profile for the cooperative setting is
U c(θ) =
∫ θH
θ
qc(θ˜)dθ˜.
The monotone-hazard condition ensures that qc is everywhere non-increasing (and hence
U c is convex) as required by Lemma 1. The expression of the least-concave nonlinear tariff
T c that implements this cooperative allocation is easily recovered from (3.3).
14The reader may wonder why we refer to these functions using the property of biconjugacy rather
than the more evocative notion of minimally concave functions through the origin. In an earlier version
of this paper, we explored common-agency games with discrete type spaces. Equilibrium contracts in this
setting are equivalent to menus with finite output-tariff pairs and so the appropriate notion of concavity
over the domain Q is unclear without more details. Biconjugacy provides the exact notion of concavity
that is required for analogous results in the discrete-type setting.
15See Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005).
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4. EQUILIBRIA AS SOLUTIONS TO SELF-GENERATING PROBLEMS
Martimort and Stole (2012) demonstrate that intrinsic common agency games are ag-
gregate games whose equilibria can be identified with the solution set to self-generating
maximization problems. Specializing the necessary and sufficient conditions in their The-
orem 2’ to our present setting, we obtain the following characterization of the entire set
of equilibrium allocations as solutions of such problems.16
Proposition 1 (U, q) is an equilibrium allocation if and only if there exists an aggregate
tariff T satisfying T (0) = 0 which implements (U, q) and which is such that (U, q) solves
the following self-generating maximization problem:
(P) : max
(U,q)∈I
Eθ
[
S(q(θ))− θq(θ)− nU(θ) + (n− 1)(T (q(θ))− θq(θ))] .
The maximization problem (P) bears some strong similarity with the cooperative
mechanism design problem (Pc). The difference comes from the fact that (P) is now
self-generating : its solution is implemented by an aggregate T that also appears in the
maximand, embedding the fixed-point nature of equilibrium. Importantly, the fact that
intrinsic common agency games are aggregate games allows a significant reduction of the
difficulties faced when characterizing such fixed points. Instead of having n optimality
conditions determining individual best responses for each principal, only one optimiza-
tion problem remains after aggregation. This simplification allows us to import powerful
techniques from optimization. In particular, this maximization problem defines a value
function (the value of the maximand for each possible realization of θ) which is more
regular than what we a priori imposed on aggregate tariffs. While aggregate tariffs are
only restricted to be upper semi-continuous, the value function is absolutely continuous
and admits a derivative almost everywhere; this is a critical step in the proof of Propo-
sition 2 below where we are able to get an even more precise description of equilibrium
allocations.
In contrast with (Pc), the objective function in (P) now features n-times the extraction
of the agent’s information rent. Each principal individually introduces distortions to ex-
tract this rent, ignoring the costs of such distortions on rivals. The n-fold term captures
the resulting tragedy of the commons that arises with each principal over-harvesting the
agent’s information rent. Because this strategic effect is embedded in the SGM program,
everything thus happens as if a surrogate principal was now in charge of maximizing
the principals’ collective payoff with the proviso that the agent’s information rent is now
weighted negatively by n. The final term in the maximand consists of n − 1 times the
agent’s payoff at the induced allocation and is the source of multiple equilibria. This
term has no consequence if either there is only one principal or if the aggregate tariff is
differentiable.17 If, however, multiple principals offer non-differentiable (possibly discon-
tinuous) tariffs, then it is possible the third term generates an allocation that is consistent
with these non-smooth tariffs. For example, if multiple principals set sufficiently negative
payments for some set of outputs, then it is an equilibrium for each principal to do so
and the solution to the optimization program will not implement such outputs.
16It is worth noting that this Proposition does not rely on the monotone hazard rate assumption.
17If the tariff is differentiable, incentive compatibility implies this term has zero marginal contribution
in equilibrium.
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Necessity. The necessity part of Proposition 1 can be obtained by summing the individ-
ual optimization problems of all principals. An equilibrium allocation, since it maximizes
each principal’s problem, also maximizes their sum. This summation introduces the n-
fold distortion. In any equilibrium with non-zero output, the agent’s information rent
will thus be overweighted by a factor of n (instead of a coefficient of 1 that would arise
had principals cooperated). It is this noncooperative information-rent externality that
the principals would like to mitigate in their equilibrium selection; an issue on which we
come back in Section 6.2 below.
Sufficiency. Establishing the sufficiency argument is more subtle. Sufficiency bears
on the fact that, under intrinsic agency, the objectives of each principal are aligned in
equilibrium with that of the surrogate principal who maximizes (P). In other words,
nothing is lost by aggregating individual objectives. From a more technical point of view,
sufficiency is obtained by reconstructing each principal’s individual maximization problem
from (P) itself. Doing so requires to propose expressions of individual equilibrium tariffs
that are derived from the aggregate, solve the self-generating problem (P) and that are
individual best responses to the tariffs other principals are offering. To this end, consider
the following construction of tariffs:
(4.1) T j(q) = Sj(q)− 1
n
(S(q)− T (q)) ∀j ∈ {1, ..., n}.
Summing over j yields an aggregate of T . Summing instead over all principals but i gives:
T−i(q) = S−i(q)− n− 1
n
(S(q)− T (q)).
By undoing the aggregate offer T−i of his rivals, principal i can always offer any aggregate
T he likes, thereby inducing any implementable allocation (U, q). This construction gives
principal i an expected payoff of
Eθ
[
Si(q(θ))− T (q(θ)) + T−i(q(θ))
]
≡ Eθ
[
S(q(θ))− T (q(θ))− n− 1
n
(S(q(θ))− T (q(θ)))
]
,
where the right-hand side equality follows from our previous equation for T−i. Expressing
payments in terms of the agent’s rent, we may simplify this payoff as
(4.2)
1
n
Eθ
[
S(q(θ))− θq(θ)− nU(θ) + (n− 1)(T (q(θ))− θq(θ))] .
The objective function (4.2) exactly replicates that of the surrogate principal up to a fac-
tor 1
n
. Therefore, principal i’s incentives to induce a particular implementable allocation
(U, q) are identical to those of this representative. As a result, all principals get the same
payoffs with the above construction:
Si(q)− T i(q) = 1
n
(S(q)− T (q)) ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}.
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5. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE EQUILIBRIUM SET
This section characterizes the complete equilibrium set. This set is large and diverse. In
addition to the differentiable equilibria that have been the focus of the existing literature,
there are an infinity of equilibria with discontinuous outputs or bunching of types. We
provide a characterization theorem for the entire set, illuminating economic features com-
mon to all equilibria and characterizing features that are unique to particular equilibrium
selections.
The solution set to the SGM program (P) is difficult to characterize. Leveraging our
assumption of bilinear preferences and our regularity assumption on H, however, we can
simplify this program, reducing it to problems in point-wise optimization. This affords us
a much sharper characterization of the equilibrium allocations. The main characterization
result of this paper follows:
Proposition 2 An allocation (U, q) belongs to Ieq if and only:
(5.1) q(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈q(Θ)
S(q)− (θ + nH(θ)) q ∀θ ∈ Θ,
(5.2) U(θ) =
∫ θH
θ
q(θ˜)dθ˜ ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Surrogate principal’s incentive constraints. Condition (5.1) represents a greatly
simplified, point-wise SGM program that embeds the strategic interactions of the prin-
cipals into a simple optimization program. Note that the domain of this program is
restricted to a self-generating set of equilibrium outputs. In contrast, the self-generation
in Proposition 1 was over the more complicated object of an aggregate tariff. It is as
if a surrogate representative of the principals is optimizing on their behalf but with an
overemphasis on rent-extraction (n weight rather than unity). At any type realization
θ, this surrogate principal, whose decisions reflect the non-cooperative behavior of the
principals, should prefer to choose the equilibrium output q(θ) rather than any other
output that would have been chosen had any other type realized. This explains why in
the maximand of (5.1), the possible outputs are taken from q(Θ).
To evaluate those best choices, the surrogate principal a priori considers the maximand
of the SGM problem (P). The first remarkable finding is that the surrogate principal’s
incentive constraints (5.1) are now written ex post instead of ex ante as in the maximand
(P). This transformation requires to replace the cost parameter θ by a new expression that
entails a n-fold information distortion due to the principals’ non-cooperative behavior,
namely θ+nH(θ). The monotone hazard rate condition ensures that this modified virtual
cost parameter remains non-decreasing and thus q is itself non-increasing. Henceforth,
any solution to a self-generating problem (P) is obtained as the solution to the relaxed
problem (Pr) where the convexity requirement for U can be omitted.
The second remarkable simplification incorporated into (5.1) is that the extra term
(n−1)(T (q)−θq) that is found into the maximand of (P) has now disappeared. Intuitively,
q(θ) is also a maximizer for this last term since it has to be the agent’s equilibrium choice.
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Although no assumption on differentiability of the equilibrium aggregate tariff T (q) is
ever made, everything happens as if an envelope condition could be used to simplify the
writing of the surrogate principal’s incentive constraints.
The third notable fact is that, although the optimization domain in (P) is Q, only
outputs in q(Θ) are used to write (5.1). This is so because q(Θ) certainly differs from Q
when T specifies sufficiently large, negative payments over Q/q(Θ).
Equilibrium allocations. The characterization of equilibrium allocations by means
of the surrogate principal’s incentive constraints (5.1) bears strong similarities with the
characterization of implementable allocations found in the literature on mechanism design
for delegated-decision making problems as in Holmstro¨m (1984), Melumad and Shibano
(1991), Martimort and Semenov (2006), Alonso and Matouschek (2008), Amador and
Bagwell (2013). This literature demonstrates how an uninformed party can delegate
decision-making to a privately-informed party in circumstances of conflicting preferences,
asymmetric information and when no incentive payments are available to align objectives.
In our context, the conflict of interest comes from the fact that, although principals would
like to cooperate, they are unable to do so when each of them can deviate to a bilateral
agreement with the agent. The non-cooperative outcome is captured by the optimizing
behavior of a surrogate principal. Yet, while cooperating principals maximize a virtual
surplus worth
(5.3) S(q)− (θ +H(θ)) q
the surrogate principal cares about a surrogate surplus that entails the modified virtual
cost parameter
(5.4) S(q)− (θ + nH(θ)) q.
This surrogate surplus accounts for the fact that non-cooperating principals extract n
times the agent’s rent while cooperating principals only care about extracting that rent
once. This difference in their concerns for rent extraction is the source of conflict between
cooperating principals and their surrogate representative.
Although there is no asymmetric information per se between the cooperating principals
and their surrogate, the latter implements at equilibrium an allocation which is a point-
wise optimum of the surrogate surplus. This maximization thus induces a set of incentive
constraints that are reminiscent of those found in the aforementioned delegation-design
literature. Borrowing techniques that were developed there provides a clear character-
ization of equilibrium outputs. Everything happens thus as if the surrogate principals
was informed on the agent’s cost himself although he replaces this cost parameter by its
non-cooperative virtual version.
Maximal Equilibrium. Following a path taken by Martimort and Stole (2015) in their
analysis of delegated common agency games, one may select among all equilibria described
in Proposition 2 by considering maximization in (5.1) over the full domain Q. We shall
denote this output allocation by qm, i.e., the unconstrained maximum of the strictly
concave objective (5.4):
qm(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈Q
S(q)− (θ + nH(θ)) q ∀θ ∈ Θ.
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The resulting range of optimal outputs in this unconstrained optimization program is also
a self-generating solution to the program in (5.1), and so we term it the maximal solu-
tion.18 Thanks to the monotone hazard rate assumption, this maximal output allocation,
which is characterized by
(5.5)
{
S ′(qm(θ)) = θ + nH(θ) if S ′(0) ≥ θ + nH(θ),
qm(θ) = 0 otherwise
is again non-increasing. Compared with a cooperative outcome, the maximal equilibrium
allocation features a distortion which is now proportional to n times the hazard rate.
This captures the fact that, at equilibrium, each principal adds his own distortion for
rent extraction reasons.
Define now the rent allocation Um as:
Um(θ) =
∫ θ2
θ
qm(θ˜)dθ˜.
Given our construction of the surrogate’s unconstrained optimal allocation, (Um, qm),
it is an immediate consequence of Proposition 2 that this allocation is an equilibrium
outcome in the common agency game.
Corollary 1 The maximal allocation (Um, qm) is an equilibrium allocation.
Observe that any equilibrium allocation must satisfy requirement (5.1), and therefore on
any interval where it is continuous and separating it must equal the maximal allocation.
This maximal equilibrium has been the focus of the earlier common agency literature.
For instance, Martimort and Stole (2012) used this particular selection to prove existence
of an equilibrium to intrinsic common agency games under broad conditions, though they
made no attempt to characterize the properties of the equilibrium set, in sharp contrast
with the present paper. In more applied work, Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 17)
modeled privatization as a common agency game between shareholders and regulators
controlling the firm’s manager. Their conclusion that joint control leads to low-powered
incentives relies on the selection of the smooth maximal equilibrium or an extreme dis-
continuous forcing equilibrium.
More detailed characterization. Next proposition provides a complete and de-
tailed characterization of all equilibrium output profiles.
Proposition 3 General Characterization of equilibrium output profiles.
An output allocation q : Θ → Q is an equilibrium outcome if and only if it satisfies the
following properties:
1. q is non-increasing, differentiable a.e. with at most a countable number of downward-
jump discontinuities,
18While we use the same notion of maximal solutions in Martimort and Stole (2015) as in the present
paper, note that the virtual surpluses in the SGM program of the delegated agency setting of Martimort
and Stole (2015) and in the present paper are different. In particular, the space of contracts in the
intrinsic common agency game is larger than in the delegated scenario since the latter only includes
non-negative tariffs.
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2. at point any of differentiability
(5.6) q˙(θ) (S ′(q(θ))− θ − nH(θ)) = 0,
3. at any discontinuity for an interior type, θ0 ∈ (θL, θH), bunching arises on both
sides of θ0 satisfying
q(θ) = qm(θ1) ∀θ ∈ [θ1, θ0) and q(θ) = qm(θ2) ∀θ ∈ (θ0, θ2]
for some θ1 and θ2 such that θ1 < θ0 < θ2.
19 The surrogate surplus is continuous
around θ0:
(5.7) S(qm(θ1))− (θ0 + nH(θ0)) qm(θ1) = S(qm(θ2))− (θ0 + nH(θ0)) qm(θ2).
Equilibrium Outputs. From (5.6), any equilibrium output profile is either flat over
some range, in which case it is unresponsive to the agent’s private information or, when
it is decreasing and continuous in θ, it corresponds to the maximal equilibrium output.
To illustrate with a scenario of some relevance for what follows, an equilibrium output
profile can be obtained simply by putting a floor on the maximal equilibrium output. In
that case, principals are unable to implement outputs which are too low.
Discontinuities in the equilibrium output q have also a quite specific structure. First,
the fact that q is non-increasing (from incentive compatibility) implies that such dis-
continuities are necessarily countable in number. Second, the fact that the surrogate
principal’s surplus is maximized at an optimal choice implies that such discontinuities
must nonetheless preserve the continuity of the surrogate surplus:
max
q∈q(Θ)
S(q)− (θ + nH(θ)) q.
Outputs on both sides of such discontinuities satisfy the simple condition (5.7), which
expresses the fact that the surrogate principal should be indifferent between moving
output on either side of the gap.
Equilibrium Ranges. Introducing a discontinuity of q at a given type θ0 amounts to
withdrawing an interval (qm(θ2), q
m(θ1)) from the range of q
m to obtain the range of q.
This may be done by imposing sufficiently negative payments for every q ∈ (qm(θ2), qm(θ1)).
Clearly, each principal is willing to offer such payments if other principals are expected
to do so. In this manner, we may generate arbitrary equilibrium allocations by introduc-
ing gaps in the maximal allocation. The maximal equilibrium contains the ranges of all
discontinuous equilibria that are constructed by introducing gaps.20
Another immediate consequence of Proposition 3 is that for any subset Q of qm(Θ)
which is the union of a countable number of intervals, there is a unique equilibrium
19q can be made either right-continuous (q(θ0) = q
m(θ1)) or left-continuous (q(θ0) = q
m(θ2)) with, of
course, no consequences on payoffs for both the agent and the principals.
20There are discontinuous equilibria that feature degenerate pooling on a single point and cannot be
generated by introducing gaps into the maximal equilibrium. The simplest such equilibrium is one in
which q(θ) = 0 for all types, Ti(0) = 0 and Ti(q) = −∞ for all q 6= 0.
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allocation q whose range is Q itself. A specific case arises when principals offer forcing
contracts at a finite number of outputs. Even though they do not provide any in-depth
analysis of those equilibria, Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 17) already devoted an
appendix to discuss an interesting subclass of equilibria which are implemented by means
of forcing contracts. Their analysis is unfortunately incomplete. Forcing contracts induce
allocations with exhibit bunching almost everywhere but they only represent a special
case of the more complete analysis of Propositions 2 and 3 above. Moreover, and in sharp
contrast with ours, their analysis is silent on the possible welfare comparison of those
non-differentiable equilibria to the smooth maximal allocation.
Tariffs. An aggregate payment T can easily be reconstructed from any equilibrium
allocation (U, q) where q satisfies (5.6) outside discontinuities and (5.7) at any disconti-
nuity point. First, using the rent profile U obtained from (5.2), the duality argument in
(3.3) gives us a nonlinear price schedule T ∗ that implements (U, q). Second, principals
are prevented from deviating to a contract that would induce the agent to choose outputs
within a discontinuity gap by imposing that the aggregate tariff T entails infinitely neg-
ative payments for q /∈ q(Θ)⋃{0} as requested from (3.5). Finally, conditions (4.1) allow
to reconstruct from this aggregate tariff the equilibrium tariffs offered by each principal.
Comparison with the cooperative outcome. It is interesting to ascertain the
validity of our findings in Propositions 2 and 3 in the limiting case where n = 1 (recall
that our maintained assumption has been n > 1). Of course, the maximal equilibrium
allocation corresponds to the cooperative solution for this case. When n = 1, the necessary
conditions in Propositions 2 and 3 continue to hold, but the sufficient conditions are no
longer valid. In fact, when n > 1, some of the equilibrium allocations are obtained by
the very fact that a given principal may not be free to choose any output because other
principals have stipulated infinitely negative payments at this output; a threat that is
only available when n > 1.
A simple numerical example. As an illustration of the various allocations that were
characterized above, let’s consider the following quadratic-uniform example. Suppose that
n = 2, S1(q) = S2(q) = 4q− 14q2, and θ is distributed uniformly on [1, 5] so that H(θ) = θ−
1. It is straightforward to derive the allocations for the first-best outcome, the cooperative
optimum, and the maximal noncooperative equilibrium as:
qfb(θ) = 8− θ, qc(θ) = max{9− 2θ, 0}, qm(θ) = max{10− 3θ, 0},
which are illustrated in Figure 1. The range of the maximal equilibrium is qm(Θ) = [0, 7].
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qfb(✓)
qc(✓)q
m(✓)
✓
q
2 3 4 5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Figure 1.— Numerical example: Output allocations for the first-best benchmark, the
cooperative benchmark and for the maximal equilibrium.
The (aggregate) tariff for the cooperative solution and the maximal equilibrium are
respectively given by:
T c(q) =
9
2
q − q
2
4
and Tm(q) =
10
3
q − q
2
6
.
Consider now taking off some outputs in that range so as to construct an equilibrium
whose range is q(Θ) = qm(Θ)/(2, 5). It is straightforward to check that q is discontinu-
ous at θ0 =
13
6
which leaves the agent indifferent between moving on either side of the
discontinuity. The corresponding equilibrium output is thus:
(5.8) q(θ) =

qm(θ) if θ ∈ [1, 5
3
]
⋃
[8
3
, 5],
5 if θ ∈ [5
3
, 13
6
],
2 if θ ∈ (13
6
, 8
3
].
In this uniform-quadratic setting, we can also verify that an implementing aggregate
tariff satisfies:
T (q) =
{
Tm(q) if q ∈ qm(Θ) [0, 2]⋃ [5, 7],
−∞ otherwise.
6. EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
We now present two approaches to possibly select within the plethora of equilibria found
above. First, under mild assumptions, the maximal equilibrium is also the best equilibrium
from the agent’s viewpoint. In sharp contrast and under similarly mild conditions, the
best equilibrium from the principals’ viewpoint is never the maximal equilibrium.
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q
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✓
Um(✓)
Ud(✓)
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8
Figure 2.— Numerical example: Output and utility allocations for the maximal
equilibrium (dashed) and the discontinuous equilibrium (solid).
6.1. Maximal Equilibrium, Biconjugacy and Agent-Optimality
The maximal equilibrium is implemented by a biconjugate tariff Tm(q) = minθ∈Θ Um(θ)+
θq. A contrario, other equilibria which feature discontinuity gaps within the range of
qm(Θ) cannot be equilibrium implemented with the corresponding biconjugate tariff
T ∗(q) = minθ∈Θ U(θ) + θq. These equilibria are instead implemented by an aggregate
tariff T such that T < T ∗ over some range.
To see why, consider an equilibrium allocation q whose range q(Θ) is obtained by
withdrawing an interval (qm(θ2), q
m(θ1)) from q
m(Θ). Let again denote by θ0 the type who
is indifferent between qm(θ2) and q
m(θ1). Suppose now that the corresponding aggregate
equilibrium tariff T , which entails infinitely negative payments over this discontinuity
gap, is replaced with the least-concave tariff T ∗ that also implements q. By construction,
T induces a SGM program whose solution is (U, q). However, replacing T by T ∗ in that
SGM program, although it changes nothing from the agent’s viewpoint, may modify its
solution. Since T ∗ entails finite payments, an output q ∈ (qm(θ2), qm(θ1)) may now become
more attractive. More precisely, T ∗ is linear over (qm(θ2), qm(θ1)) and the agent with type
θ0 is actually indifferent between all options in (q
m(θ2), q
m(θ1)). Yet, a principal may now
find it attractive to induce this type to choose an output within this discontinuity gap so
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that (U, q) is no longer a solution of a new SGM program obtained with T ∗ replacing T .
Imposing biconjugacy on the aggregate tariff thus certainly refines the equilibrium set.
Indeed, it limits the possibility that principals have to collectively prevent a deviation by
offering an aggregate tariff with infinitely negative payments over a discontinuity gap.
Proposition 4 The maximal equilibrium (Um, qm) is the only equilibrium sustained by
a biconjugate aggregate tariff.
Geometry and Welfare properties. Consider an equilibrium (U, q) whose range
q(Θ) is obtained by withdrawing an interval (qm(θ1), q
m(θ2)) from q
m(Θ) and let again
denote by θ0 the point of discontinuity for q. We now want to compare the rent profiles
U and Um.
A first observation is that those profiles are of course identical on [θ2, θH ] since U(θ) =∫ θH
θ
q(θ˜)dθ˜, Um(θ) =
∫ θH
θ
qm(θ˜)dθ˜ and outputs are the same on that interval; q(θ˜) = qm(θ)
on [θ2, θH ]. Second, from Proposition 3, the equilibrium output q lies below (resp. above)
qm over [θ0, θ2] (resp. [θ1, θ0]). The overall impact of those distortions on how U compares
with Um is thus ambiguous. Next example nicely illustrates how this ambiguity can be
solved.
Numerical example (continued). Take the equilibrium output q defined in (5.8).
We can check that∫ 8
3
5
3
q(θ˜)dθ˜ =
(
13
6
− 5
3
)
× 5 +
(
8
3
− 13
6
)
× 2 ≡ 7
2
=
∫ 8
3
5
3
qm(θ˜)dθ˜.
That equality is remarkable. It means that the rent profiles U and Um are the same not
only on [8
3
, 5] but also on [1, 5
3
], as shown graphically on Figure 2. Over the interval (5
3
, 8
3
),
instead U < Um. The argument could be generalized in a straightforward manner to any
possible countable number discontinuities and to any quadratic surplus function if the
types distribution is uniform. In other words, the maximal equilibrium yields an upper
bound on all equilibrium rent profiles.
The geometry of these results is interesting in itself. The graph of the rent profile U is
obtained from that of Um by replacing the strictly convex part of Um over [5
3
, 8
3
] by the
maximum of the two tangents at the points 5
3
and 8
3
, namely
max
{
Um
(
5
3
)
+ 5
(
θ − 5
3
)
;Um
(
8
3
)
+ 2
(
θ − 8
3
)}
.
At the discontinuity point θ0, the two tangents cross; capturing the fact that θ0 is indif-
ferent between choosing qm
(
5
3
)
= 5 and qm
(
8
3
)
= 2.
The fact that the aggregate surplus function is quadratic and the distribution of types
is uniform plays a key role in the example above. Provided that the addition of the
discontinuity gap remains small enough, the surplus function is always locally quadratic
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and the distribution uniform, we might thus hope to get similar striking results in more
general contexts. To this end, consider introducing a discontinuity gap around a given
point θ0 ∈ (θL, θH) and the corresponding equilibrium (U, q). This gap again takes the
form (qm(θ1(ε)), q
m(θ2(ε))) where θ2(ε) = θ0 + ε. We will be interested in the case where
ε is small enough and index accordingly the equilibrium rent and output (U ε, qε).
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Proposition 5 Suppose that H is twice differentiable with H¨ ≥ 0, and S is thrice
differentiable with S ′′′ ≤ 0. Then, for ε small enough, we have:
U ε(θ) ≤ Um(θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Under rather mild conditions (which in particular hold for the case of a quadratic sur-
plus and a uniform distribution as in our running example), introducing a small discon-
tinuity gap in the equilibrium range of outputs cannot improve the agent’s rent. Using
familiar duality arguments, the corresponding (least-concave) aggregate tariffs can be
ranked as follows:
T ∗ε (q) = min
θ∈Θ
U ε(θ) + θq ≤ T ∗(q) = min
θ∈Θ
U(θ) + θq.
The tariff in the maximal equilibrium is thus the upper envelope of all least-concave
aggregate tariffs that implement other equilibria.
6.2. Principals-Ex Ante Optimality
Another possibility is to select among equilibria in terms of the expected net surplus
they give to the principals. Indeed, if principals could meet ex ante and negotiate over
the equilibrium to be played, a reasonable prediction would be that they would agree
to play the equilibrium that maximizes their ex ante collective payoff. Therefore, we
now investigate what is this ex ante best equilibrium allocation for the principals. In
this respect, Proposition 3 shows for any set Q such that Q ⊂ qm(Θ) and Q is a union
of countable intervals, there is a unique equilibrium allocation, q such that q(Θ) = Q.
This allocation fully defines the corresponding aggregate transfer as we have seen. Thus,
the equilibrium selection problem can be reduced to the principals optimally choosing a
delegation set Q to offer to the surrogate representative, who then chooses an allocation
solving a self-generating maximization program (P) where the equilibrium tariff T has
domain Q. Restated in this form, we may apply a recent result from Amador and Bagwell
(2013),22 to conclude that the optimal delegation set is a connected interval putting a
floor on outputs. To do so, it is sufficient to make the following assumption on the types
distribution.
Assumption 1 For almost all θ ∈ Θ(
nH˙(θ) + 1
)(
H˙(θ) + 1
)
≥ (n− 1)H(θ)H¨(θ).
In tandem with our assumption of a monotone hazard rate, Assumption 1 requires
that H is not too convex. It is satisfied by several well-known distributions with positive
supports, including uniform, exponential, Laplace, Pareto, Weibull and Chi-square.23
21Although Proposition 5 deals with the case of a single discontinuity gap, it is straightforward to
again generalize these findings to account for more discontinuities.
22See Martimort and Semenov (2006) and Alonso and Matoushek (2008) for earlier slightly stronger
conditions along those lines.
23This property is verified for the Weibull and Chi-square distributions using numerical methods.
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Proposition 6 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. The principals’ best equilibrium from
an ex ante point of view is characterized by an output interval, Q = [qm(θˆ), qm(θL)], with
θˆ > θL and
(6.1) Eθ
[
S ′(qm(θˆ))− θ −H(θ)|θ ≥ θˆ
]
= 0.
When qm(θH) > 0, we have θˆ < θH and the maximal equilibrium is never ex ante optimal.
Proposition 6 tells us that the range of the maximal equilibrium, qm(Θ), generates
too much informational-rent distortion from an ex ante point of view for the principals.
They would prefer to put a floor on the set of equilibrium outputs, thereby reducing the
sensitivity of the output allocation on the agent’s underlying type, in order to mitigate
the problem of excessive rent extraction. Such a floor can be implemented by an aggregate
tariff which sets T (q) = −∞ for any q ∈ (0, qm(θˆ)).
Numerical example (continued). Using the definition of qm given in (5.5), Condition
(6.1) can be written in terms of the cut-off θˆ only as:
Eθ
(
2θ − 1|θ ≥ θˆ
)
= min
{
8, 3θˆ − 2
}
.
Tedious computations show that the cut-off is θˆ = 3. The output profile at the ex ante
best non-cooperative equilibrium is a truncation of the maximal equilibrium profile:
q(θ) = max {1, 10− 3θ} .
At that best equilibrium, the principals shut down payments for q less than qˆ = qm(3) = 1.
Bunching arises over the upper tail of the distribution [3, 5]:
T (q) =

0 if q = 0,
11
6
+ 10
3
q − q2
6
if q ∈ [1, 7],
−∞ otherwise.
Observe also that qˆ > qm(5) = 0 so that, by restricting the equilibrium set of outputs prin-
cipals are able to implement outputs that are sometimes above the cooperative solution.
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PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 1: The proof is standard and thus omitted. See Rochet (1987) or
Milgrom and Segal (2002). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: The proof follows similar steps to those in Martimort and
Stole (2012, Theorem 2’), though for completeness, we explicitly treat here the agent’s
participation decision, δ which was left implicit in this paper.
Necessity. Given the aggregate tariff T−i offered by competing principals, principal i’s
net gain with the agent of type θ when (q, δ) ∈ Q× {0, 1} is chosen is given by
Si(q)− δT (q) ≡ Si(q)− θq + δT−i(q)− (δT (q)− θq).
For (U, q, δ) to be an equilibrium allocation, it must be that principal i desires to imple-
ment this allocation which must thus solve:
(U, q, δ) ∈ arg max
(U,q,δ)∈I
Eθ[Si(q(θ))− θq(θ) + δ(θ)T−i(q(θ))− U(θ)].
Note that every principal i faces the same domain of maximization, I. The difference
between the programs of any two principals, i and j, is entirely embedded in the differences
in the aggregates T−i and T−j. Following Martimort and Stole (2012)’s analysis of general
aggregate games, an equilibrium allocation must necessarily maximize the sum of the
principals’ programs. Thus, (U, q, δ) must solve:
(A1) (U, q, δ) ∈ arg max
(U,q,δ)∈I
Eθ
[
S(q(θ))− θq(θ)− nU(θ) + (n− 1)(δ(θ)T (q(θ))− θq(θ))] .
The solution to this problem has always at least one type, say θˆ, such that
(A2) U(θˆ) = 0.
Indeed, if it was not the case, then the whole rent profile U could be reduced uniformly
by  > 0 without modifying output and this modification would improve the value of the
program. This means that, at least one principal would have an incentive to deviate by
uniformly reducing his payment to the agent by .
From a remark in the text, any aggregate tariff that implements an equilibrium (U, q)
solution to the SGM problem above must satisfy:
T (q) ≤ T ∗(q) = min
θ∈Θ
U(θ) + θq
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with equality at all q ∈ q(Θ). In particular, this condition should hold for the equilibrium
aggregate tariff T . From (A2), it follows that T ∗(0) = minθ∈Θ U(θ) = 0 and thus:
(A3) T (0) ≤ 0.
Consider now the new tariff T˜ obtained from T as:
T˜ (q) =
{
0 if q = 0,
T (q) otherwise.
Because of (A3), T˜ is itself upper semi-continuous. Moreover, we have:
T (q) ≤ T˜ (q) ≤ T ∗(q) ∀q ∈ Q.
Because both T and T ∗ implement (U, q, δ), we deduce from those inequalities that T˜ also
does so. Under T˜ , every agent type chooses to participate δ˜(θ) = 1 because he has always
the option to choose q = 0 and get thereby his reservation payoff that is normalized
at zero. Because the objective function in (A1) has the same expected value at (U, q, δ)
using T as it does at (U, q, δ˜) using T˜ , we conclude that
(U, q) ∈ arg max
(U,q)∈I
Eθ
[
S(q(θ))− θq(θ)− nU(θ) + (n− 1)(T˜ (q(θ))− θq(θ))
]
.
This new problem is again self-generating and (U, q) is equilibrium implemented by T˜ .
Sufficiency. Consider a solution (U, q) to (P) which is implemented by the aggregate
tariff T . Note that because (U, q) is implemented by T with T (0) = 0, we are considering
the case where the agent always participates, δ = 1. Let us now construct individual
tariffs T i satisfying
T i(q) = Si(q)− 1
n
(S(q)− T (q)) ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}.
By construction,
n∑
i=1
T i(q) = T (q).
We show that this contract profile (T 1, ..., T n) is an equilibrium. Suppose indeed that
all principals j for j 6= i offer T j. At a best response, principal i induces an allocation
(U, q, δ) that solves:
(Pi) : max
(U,q,δ)∈I
Eθ
[
Si(q(θ))− θq(θ)− U(θ) + T−i(q(θ))
]
.
Inserting the expressions of T j (for j 6= i) using our construction above), the allocation
that principal i would like to induce should solve
max
(U,q,δ)∈I
Eθ
[
S(q(θ))− θq(θ)− nU(θ) + (n− 1)(T (q(θ))− θq)] .
But this is the same maximization program in (A1), and hence principal i’s choice T i is
a best response against T−i. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 2: Necessity. Because of (3.1), any implementable rent
profile is non-increasing. It follows that, necessarily, for any solution to (P) where the
agent’s rent is minimized, we must have:
(A4) U(θH) = 0.
From (3.1) and (A4), we thus get (5.2). Inserting this expression of the rent into the
maximand of (P) and integrating by parts shows that any solution to the relaxed problem
(Pr) obtained when the convexity requirement on U has been omitted should also solve
point-wise the following problems:
(A5) q(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈Q
S(q)− (θ + nH(θ)) q + (n− 1)(T (q)− θq), a.e.,
where T implements (U, q).
Because the monotone hazard rate property holds (i.e., H˙(θ) ≥ 0), θ+nH(θ) is increas-
ing in θ. Therefore, it immediately follows from standard revealed preferences arguments
that q(θ) that solves (A5) is necessarily non-decreasing. Thus, the solution to the relaxed
problem (Pr) also solves (P) with the addition of the convexity requirement for U .
Define now the value function for the program (A5) as:
(A6) V (θ) ≡ max
q∈Q
S(q)− (θ + nH(θ)) q + (n− 1)(T (q)− θq).
Because the maximand on the right-hand side of (A6) is absolutely continuous in θ,
upper semi-continuous in q and Q is compact, V (θ) is itself absolutely continuous (Mil-
grom and Segal (2002)). Moreover, given that (U, q) is an incentive-compatible allocation
which solves this program, we have:
V (θ) = S(q(θ))− (θ + nH(θ)) q(θ) + (n− 1)U(θ).
Because V is absolutely continuous, it is almost everywhere differentiable and it admits
the integral representation:
V (θ)− V (θ′) = −
∫ θ
θ′
[(
1 + nH˙(θ˜)
)
q(θ˜) + (n− 1)q(θ˜)
]
dθ˜ ∀(θ, θ′).
Because U is also absolutely continuous, we have:
U(θ)− U(θ′) = −
∫ θ
θ′
q(θ˜)dθ˜ ∀(θ, θ′).
Note that
S(q(θ))− (θ + nH(θ)) q(θ)− [S(q(θ′))− (θ′ + nH(θ′)) q(θ′)]
= V (θ)− V (θ′)− (n− 1) [U(θ)− U(θ′)] .
Thus S(q(θ))− (θ + nH(θ)) q(θ) is also absolutely continuous, and admits the following
integral representation:
S(q(θ))− (θ + nH(θ)) q(θ)− [S(q(θ′))− (θ′ + nH(θ′)) q(θ′)]
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= −
∫ θ
θ′
(
1 + nH˙(θ˜)
)
q(θ˜)dθ˜.
Observe that
(H(θ)−H(θ′)) q(θ′) =
∫ θ
θ′
H˙(θ˜)q(θ′)dθ˜.
Using this latter condition, the monotone hazard rate property (H˙(θ) ≥ 0) and the fact
that q is non-increasing, we obtain:
S(q(θ))− (θ + nH(θ)) q(θ)− [S(q(θ′))− (θ + nH(θ)) q(θ′)]
=
∫ θ
θ′
(
1 + nH˙(θ˜)
)
(q(θ′)− q(θ˜))dθ˜ ≥ 0.
Because any q′ ∈ q(Θ) can be identified with some θ′ ∈ Θ so that q′ = q(θ′), the inequality
implies q(θ) satisfies (5.1) point-wise in θ.
Sufficiency. Consider any allocation (U, q) that satisfies (5.1), and (5.2). Simple re-
vealed preferences arguments from (5.1) together with the monotone hazard rate property
(H˙(θ) ≥ 0) imply that q is non-increasing. Then, (5.2) implies that U is convex. We now
prove that this allocation is equilibrium implementable. First, we construct an aggre-
gate transfer by duality as in (3.3) and obtain T from (3.5). By construction q(θ) is a
maximizer of T (q) − θq over q(Θ). Second, individual contracts are then recovered by
using (4.1). Third, we need to check that the optimality conditions (A5) for the surrogate
principal’s optimization problem are satisfied. This last step is an immediate consequence
from the fact that q(θ) is a maximizer for both S(q)− (θ + nH(θ)) q and T (q)− θq over
q(Θ) so that it also maximizes a convex combination of both objectives. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1: Consider Tm(q) = minq∈Q Um(θ) + θq. We now define a
SGM problem associated to that tariff and check that (Um, qm) is a solution. Indeed,
once one has taken care of the expression of the rent and integrating by parts, this SGM
problem can be rewritten as in (A5) in terms of output only as:
(A7) qm(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈Q
S(q)− (θ + nH(θ)) q + (n− 1)(Tm(q)− θq).
That qm is indeed a solution then follows from the fact that qm(θ) ∈ arg maxq∈Q S(q)−
(θ + nH(θ)) q and qm(θ) ∈ arg maxq∈Q (n− 1)(Tm(q)− θq). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: Necessity. That q should be non-increasing follows from
the first step in the proof of Proposition 2. Thus, q is almost everywhere differentiable
(countable number of possible discontinuities). At any point θ where q is differentiable,
the first-order necessary condition for optimality of the incentive problem
θ ∈ arg max
θˆ∈Θ
S(q(θˆ))− (θ + nH(θ)) q(θˆ) ∀θ ∈ Θ
gives us (5.6).
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Consider now the value function V as defined in (A6). V is continuous and thus at a
point of discontinuity θ0 for q we have:
(A8) lim
θ→θ−0
V (θ) = lim
θ→θ+0
V (θ).
Because q is non-increasing, it is almost everywhere differentiable and such points of
discontinuity are necessarily isolated. On the right- and the left- hand neighborhoods
of θ0, (5.6) thus applies and either q˙(θ) = 0 or q(θ) = q
m(θ). Moreover, at a point at
which q is continuous but not differentiable, it must be that either the right- or the left-
derivative is zero. We are going to prove that bunching arises both on a right- and a
left-neighborhood of θ0. We proceed by contradiction.
To this end, suppose first that bunching arises on the left-neighborhood only and call
thus q(θ−0 ) = limθ→θ−0 q(θ) with q(θ
−
0 ) > q
m(θ0) because q cannot be non-decreasing
at such discontinuity. Observe that q(θ−0 ) = q
m(θ1) for some type θ1 < θ0 such that
θ1 = max{θ s.t. qm(θ) ≥ q(θ−0 )} and that qm(θ1) = q(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ1, θ0).
Because the agent’s rent U is also continuous at θ0, we have:
U(θ0) = lim
θ→θ−0
T (q(θ))− θq(θ) = T (q(θ−0 ))− θq(θ−0 )
and
U(θ0) = lim
θ→θ+0
T (q(θ))− θq(θ) = T (qm(θ0))− θqm(θ0).
Therefore, we get:
T (q(θ−0 ))− θq(θ−0 ) = T (qm(θ0))− θqm(θ0).
Inserting this equality into (A8) and simplifying yields:
lim
θ→θ−0
S(q(θ))− (θ + nH(θ)) q(θ) = lim
θ→θ+0
S(qm(θ))− (θ + nH(θ)) qm(θ).
Expressing those right- and left-hand side limits gives us:
(A9) S(q(θ−0 ))− (θ0 + nH(θ0)) q(θ−0 ) = S(qm(θ0))− (θ0 + nH(θ0)) qm(θ0).
Because S is strictly concave, qm(θ0) is the unique maximizer of S(q) − (θ0 + nH(θ0)) q
and (A9) necessarily implies that q(θ−0 ) = q
m(θ0). A contradiction with our starting
premise that q(θ−0 ) > q
m(θ0) at a discontinuity.
Similarly, we could also rule out the case where bunching only arises on the right-
neighborhood of θ0 at a value q(θ
+
0 ) = limθ→θ+0 q(θ).
Taking stock of these findings, we necessarily have q(θ−0 ) > q
m(θ0) > q(θ
+
0 ) at a dis-
continuity point θ0. This implies in passing that θ0 must be such that q
m(θ0) > 0 and
discontinuities do not lie on the lower boundary of the output space. Moreover, bunch-
ing arises on both sides of θ0 which means q(θ) = q(θ
−
0 ) (resp. q(θ) = q(θ
+
0 )) for θ on
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this left- (resp. right-) neighborhood. Because qm is strictly decreasing, there thus exist
θ1 < θ0 < θ2 such that q(θ
−
0 ) = q
m(θ1) and q(θ
+
0 ) = q
m(θ2). In fact q(θ) = q
m(θ1)
for all θ ∈ [θ1, θ0). Suppose not. Then, q would have a downward discontinuity at some
θ′0 ∈ (θ1, θ0). The same argument as above shows that at any such putative discontinuity,
we should have q(θ
′−
0 ) > q
m(θ
′
0) > q(θ
′+
0 ) and q(θ
′+
0 ) ≥ qm(θ1). Since qm is decreasing,
this is a contradiction with the definition of θ
′
0.
Because the agent’s rent U is continuous at θ0, we now have:
U(θ0) = lim
θ→θ−0
T (q(θ))− θq(θ) = T (qm(θ1))− θqm(θ1)
and
U(θ0) = lim
θ→θ+0
T (q(θ))− θq(θ) = T (qm(θ2))− θqm(θ2).
It follows that:
T (qm(θ1))− θqm(θ1) = T (qm(θ2))− θqm(θ2).
Inserting this equality into (A8) and simplifying now yields:
lim
θ→θ−0
S(q(θ))− (θ + nH(θ)) q(θ) = lim
θ→θ+0
S(q(θ))− (θ + nH(θ)) q(θ).
Expressing those right- and left-hand side limits gives us
S(qm(θ1))− (θ0 + nH(θ0)) qm(θ1) = S(qm(θ2))− (θ0 + nH(θ0)) qm(θ2)
which is (5.7).
Sufficiency. It directly follows from the sufficiency part of the proof of Proposition 2.
From the equilibrium output schedule q, we reconstruct U(θ) =
∫ θH
θ
q(θ˜)dθ˜, the aggregate
tariff T (q) = minθ∈Θ U(θ) + θq and individual tariffs so that Si(q)−T i(q) = S(q)−T (q).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: Proposition 1 shows that the maximal equilibrium (Um, qm)
is an equilibrium. Since we have both Tm(q) = minθ∈Θ Um(θ)+θq and Um(θ) = maxq∈Q Tm(q)−
θq, (Um, qm) is in fact a biconjugate equilibrium. Consider now another equilibrium (U, q)
whose range q(Θ) presents one discontinuity gap (qm(θ2), q
m(θ1)) for some (θ1, θ2). (The
case of several discontinuity gaps follows similar steps and is omitted.) From our previous
analysis, the corresponding discontinuity of q is at some θ0 ∈ (θ1, θ2) with q(θ+0 ) = qm(θ2)
and q(θ−0 ) = q
m(θ1). Clearly, T 6= T ∗ where T ∗ is the least-concave tariff that implements
q and which is defined as T ∗(q) = minθ∈Θ U(θ) + θq.
We want to prove that replacing the implementing tariff T as proposed in (3.5) by
T ∗ changes the solution to the SGM problem (P) and, more precisely, that (U, q) is no
longer a solution to the new SGM problem (P∗) so constructed. First, observe that T ∗
is concave, and linear over (qm(θ2), q
m(θ1)) with slope θ0 ∈ (θ1, θ2), i.e., T ∗′(q) = θ0 for
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q ∈ (qm(θ2), qm(θ1)). Second, we notice that the surrogate surplus at θ0 is itself strictly
concave. It writes as:
S(q)− (θ0 + nH(θ0)) q + (n− 1)(T (q)− θ0q).
This expression is maximized at qm(θ0) ∈ (qm(θH), qm(θL)) and thus, we should have
q(θ0) = q
m(θ0) if (U, q) was the solution to the self-generating problem (P∗). However, at
the non-maximal equilibrium (U, q), θ0 should be indifferent between the two boundaries
of the discontinuity gap, namely qm(θ1) and q
m(θ2) and cannot take any option within
this gap (qm(θ1), q
m(θ2)). A contradiction. Hence, (U, q) is no longer a solution to (P∗).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: First, we notice that U ε and U
m are identical on [θ2(ε), θH ]
since U ε(θ) =
∫ θH
θ
qε(θ˜)dθ˜, U
m(θ) =
∫ θH
θ
qm(θ˜)dθ˜ and outputs are the same on that
interval, namely qε(θ) = q
m(θ) on [θ2(ε), θH ]. Second, observe that, over the discontinuity
gap [θ1(ε), θ2(ε)], the equilibrium rent U ε satisfies:
(A10) U ε(θ1(ε))− U ε(θ2(ε)) = qm(θ2(ε))(θ2(ε)− θ0) + qm(θ1(ε))(θ0 − θ1(ε)).
Third, for the discontinuity gap so considered, condition (5.7) now writes as:
(A11) S(qm(θ1(ε)))−(θ0 + nH(θ0)) qm(θ1(ε)) = S(qm(θ2(ε)))−(θ0 + nH(θ0)) qm(θ2(ε)).
Observe that a discontinuity can only arise at a point θ0 such q
m(θ0) > 0. Thus q
m
given in (5.3) is positive and everywhere differentiable (and twice times so when S is
thrice so) in a neighborhood of θ0 with q˙
m(θ) < 0 there. We thus have:
(S ′(qm(θ))− θ)q˙m(θ) = nH(θ)q˙m(θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ.
We also have:
(S ′(qm(θ))− θ)q˙m(θ) = d
dθ
(S(qm(θ))− θqm(θ)) + qm(θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Hence,
nH(θ)q˙m(θ) =
d
dθ
(S(qm(θ))− θqm(θ)) + qm(θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Integrating over the interval [θ1(ε), θ2(ε)], we obtain:
n
∫ θ2(ε)
θ1(ε)
H(θ)q˙m(θ)dθ = S(qm(θ2(ε))−θ2qm(θ2(ε)−(S(qm(θ1(ε))− θ1qm(θ1(ε))+
∫ θ2(ε)
θ1(ε)
qm(θ)dθ.
Simplifying using (A10) and (A11), we finally obtain:
n
∫ θ2(ε)
θ1(ε)
H(θ)q˙m(θ)dθ = nH(θ0)(q
m(θ2(ε))−qm(θ1(ε)))−(U(θ1(ε))−U(θ2(ε)))+
∫ θ2(ε)
θ1(ε)
qm(θ)dθ.
Let us now define
∆(ε) = U ε(θ1(ε))− U ε(θ2(ε))− (Um(θ1(ε))− Um(θ2(ε))).
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Since U ε and U
m are identical on [θ2(ε), θH ], the sign of ∆(ε) also measures whether
U ε(θ1(ε)) might lie above (when ∆(ε) ≥ 0) or below (when ∆(ε) ≤ 0) Um(θ1(ε)).
From the previous steps, we get:
∆(ε) = n (ψ(θ2(ε))− ψ(θ1(ε)))
where
ψ(θ) = H(θ0)q
m(θ)−
∫ θ
θ0
H(θ)q˙m(θ)dθ.
Observe that
ψ˙(θ0) = 0, and ψ¨(θ0) = −H˙(θ0)q˙m(θ0) > 0.
We now write θ1(ε) = θ0−ϕ(ε) for some function ϕ when θ2(ε) = θ0 + ε. Observe that
(A11) implies that ϕ(ε) goes to zero with ε. We also define:
Γ(ε) = S(qm(θ0 + ε))− (θ0 + nH(θ0)) qm(θ0 + ε).
Tedious computations show that:
Γ′(0) = 0, Γ′′(0) = q˙m(θ0)
(
1 + nH˙(θ0)
)
and
Γ′′′(0) = q˙m(θ0)
(
2S ′′(qm(θ0))q¨m(θ0) + nH¨(θ0)
)
.
Third-order Taylor expansions immediately give us:
Γ(ε) = Γ(0) +
Γ′′(0)
2
ε2 +
Γ′′′(0)
6
ε3 + o(ε3)
and
Γ(−ϕ(ε)) = Γ(0) + Γ
′′(0)
2
ϕ2(ε)− Γ
′′′(0)
6
ϕ3(ε) + o(ε3).
Observe that (A11) can then be written as Γ(ε) = Γ(−ϕ(ε)) or, using the above Taylor
expansions,
Γ′′(0)
2
ε2 +
Γ′′′(0)
6
ε3 =
Γ′′(0)
2
ϕ2(ε)− Γ
′′′(0)
6
ϕ3(ε) + o(ε3).
Up to terms of order of magnitude greater than two, we thus obtain:
(A12) ϕ(ε) = ε+
nH¨(θ0) + 2S
′′(qm(θ0))q¨m(θ0)
1 + nH˙(θ0)
ε2
6
+ o(ε2).
Turning now to a Taylor expansion of ∆(ε) up to terms of magnitude higher than 2,
we get:
∆(ε) = n
ψ¨(θ0)
2
(ε− ϕ(ε)) 2ε+ o(ε2).
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Observe that H¨ ≥ 0 and S ′′′ ≤ 0 imply q¨m ≤ 0 since S ′′′(qm(θ))(q˙m(θ))2+S ′′(qm(θ))q˙m(θ) =
nH¨(θ). Thus ϕ(ε) > ε. Hence, ∆(ε) is negative for ε positive and small enough. Finally,
U ε(θ1(ε)) ≤ Um(θ1(ε)) and thus
U ε(θ) = U ε(θ1(ε)) +
∫ θ1(ε)
θ
qm(θ)dθ ≤ U(θ) = Um(θ1(ε)) +
∫ θ1(ε)
θ
qm(θ)dθ
which concludes the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: We make use of Proposition 1 in Amador and Bagwell
(2013). Using the notation of Amador and Bagwell (2013), we transform θ into the type,
γ = −(θ+nH(θ)), and let φ(γ) denote the inverse mapping. The corresponding density for
γ is given by f˜(γ) = f(φ(γ))|φ′(γ)|. Let F˜ (γ) denote the distribution of γ. We transform
output q into the choice pi and define the overall surplus as b(pi) = S(pi) so that the
agent’s preferences can be written as
b(pi) + γpi
as required. The principal’s preferences can now be also rewritten as
w(γ, pi) = b(pi) + γpi + (n− 1)H(φ(γ))pi.
Because the agent’s best action, pif (γ) = q
m(φ(γ)), is strictly positive for all γ, it is
straightforward to check that our setting satisfies Assumption 1 in Amador and Bagwell
(2013).
To prove our interval set is the optimal form of delegation, we need to verify conditions
(c1), (c2), (c2’), (c3) and (c3’) of Amador and Bagwell (2013). Given our conjectured so-
lution, conditions (c2) and(c3’) are satisfied. Given the principal and agent have perfectly
aligned preferences for γ = φ(θL), condition (c2’) is satisfied. Assuming that condition
(c1) is satisfied and that γL = φ(θˆ), where θˆ is defined in (6.1), then condition (c3) is also
satisfied. Condition (6.1) is the defining first-order condition for finding an optimal floor
delegation set. What remains to be show is that (c1) is satisfied. Finally, it is sufficient
for (c1) that
F˜ (γ)− (n− 1)H(φ(γ))f˜(γ)
is nondecreasing. Differentiating, we shall prove
f˜(γ)− (n− 1)
(
H˙(φ(γ))f˜(γ)φ′(γ) +H(φ(γ))f˜ ′(γ)
)
≥ 0.
Using f˜ = −fφ′, we have f˜ ′(γ) = −f ′(θ)φ′2 − f(θ)φ′′(γ). Because
φ′(γ) =
−1
1 + nH˙(φ(γ))
,
we have φ′′(γ) = φ′3nH¨(φ(γ)). Substituting these relationships into our inequality and
simplifying, we reduce our required condition to Assumption 1.
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Consider thus a “floor equilibrium” with an allocation
(A13) q(θ) = max{qm(θ), qm(θ∗)} for some θ∗ ∈ Θ.
together with the rent minimization requirement (5.2). The maximal equilibrium is simply
obtained by choosing θ∗ = θ2 as a special case. The sum of the principal’s profits evaluated
at such equilibria can be expressed in terms of the floor θ∗ only as:
V (θ∗) =
∫ θ∗
θ1
(S(qm(θ))− (θ +H(θ)) qm(θ)) f(θ)dθ
+
∫ θ2
θ∗
(S(qm(θ∗))− (θ +H(θ)) qm(θ∗)) f(θ)dθ.
Differentiating with respect to θ∗ yields:
V˙ (θ∗) = q˙m(θ∗)
∫ θ2
θ∗
(S ′(qm(θ∗))− θ −H(θ)) f(θ)dθ.
From this, we immediately get that:
(A14) V˙ (θ1) = q˙
m(θ1)
∫ θ2
θ1
(θ1 − θ −H(θ)) f(θ)dθ > 0,
where the last inequality follows from θ1− θ−H(θ) < 0 and q˙m(θ1) < 0. Second, we also
obtain:
(A15) V˙ (θ2) = 0 with V¨ (θ2) = −(n− 1)q˙m(θ2) > 0
when H˙(θ) ≥ 0 and qm(θ2) > 0 so that qm(θ) is strictly decreasing in that neighborhood
of θ2. Hence, although θ2 is a local extremum of V , it corresponds to a minimum. It follows
that the maximal equilibrium is never optimal. From (A14), we derive the existence of
a maximum θˆ which is necessarily interior. Rewriting the condition V˙ (θˆ) = 0 gives us
(6.1). Q.E.D.
